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Gonzalez v. Crosby,
No. 04-6432 (U.S., June 23, 2005): The Supreme Court held that Rule 60(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure can be used in habeas cases as long as the claim does not contest the merits of the original appeal; and in such cases, the strict rules of the AEDPA governing second or successive habeas petitions do not apply.
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Spitznas v. Boone,
No. 05-6236 (10th Cir., September 29, 2006) (Published): Habeas Corpus; Rule 60: The panel applies the Supreme Court's opinion in Gonzalez concerning when a Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a successive habeas petition or a "true" Rule 60(b) motion. Rule 60(b) is concerned with procedural claims; if the claims are substantive then the motion will be treated as a successive petition. In this case, the panel sets forth the proper mode of analysis governing these claims and concludes that Spitznas raised both types in his Rule 60(b) motion and thus remanded to the District Court on one claim and denied a COA and leave to file a successive application on the other claim.
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United States v. Pedraza,
No. 05-2141 (10th Cir., October 25, 2006) (Published): Habeas Corpus; Rule 60: Pro se appellant filed various motions under Rule 60 and Rule 59(e) apparently trying to avoid the procedural traps of successive 2255 petitions. He is unsuccessful and the panel held that his motion for reconsideration was itself in part a second 2255 petition and in part a "true" Rule 59(e) motion. This case further construes the circuit's recent decision in Spitznas v. Boone which outlines the analytical framework of these issues.
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