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In Re: Rutherford,
No. 06-10784 (11th Cir., January 30, 2006): Rutherford applied for leave to file a second or successive habeas application. The law now requires a Petitioner to obtain permission from the Circuit first before filing a second or successive Petition and the requirements are very strict. This case is not a winner since the Eleventh Circuit denied Rutherford's application, but I thought it was a good, tight opinion outlining the requirements for successive Petitions in habeas cases and applying those requirements to issues such as a Brady claim, an actual innocence claim based upon recanted witness testimony, and claims based upon subsequent Supreme Court cases of Crawford v. Washington (regarding confrontation/cross-examination) and Deck v. Missouri (regarding "shackling" at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial). Note that in successive habeas applications, the Supreme Court itself must make the new case retroactive to cases on collateral review; it is not enough under the statute that an appeals court does it. Tough stuff.
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In Re: James Lee Henderson,
No. 06-40320 (5th Cir., August 23, 2006): Habeas Corpus; Second/Successive: The Circuit allows Henderson leave to file a successive habeas petition on a mental retardation claim under Atkins.
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Ackerman v. Novak,
No. 06-1464 (10th Cir., March 15, 2007) (per curiam) (Published): Habeas Corpus; Second/Successive: Ackerman was convicted in a military court martial. He moved for permission in the Circuit to file a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. HELD: DISMISSED as unnecessary since military convictions can be attacked under section 2241 rather than 2254; and, as a matter of first impression, section 2241 cases do not require authorization by the Court of Appeals.
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Ochoa v. Sirmons,
No. 06-6349 (10th Cir., April 6, 2007) (Published): Habeas Corpus; Second/Successive: The Circuit grants authorization for this Oklahoma death row inmate to file a second federal habeas petition on a mental retardation claim under Atkins. The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(A) allows a state prisoner to seek authorization when the Supreme Court makes a new rule of constitutional law retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review (the Supreme Court did so in Atkins). The State argued that more is required, such as a prima facie showing of mental retardation. Other circuits have imposed the prima facie showing requirement, notably the Fifth Circuit which services death cases in Texas, but the Tenth Circuit parts company with the other circuits in this case, concluding that the plain language of the statute does not require such a showing.
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In re Mathis,
No. 06-20806 (5th Cir., April 2, 2007): Habeas Corpus; Second/Successive: The Fifth Circuit allows authorization to file a second habeas petition in a capital case based on a mental retardation claim pursuant to Atkins.
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Panetti v. Quarterman,
No. 06-6407 (U.S., June 28, 2007): 1) Insanity/Competency; 2) Habeas Corpus; Second/Successive: This is another 5-4 opinion in a capital case in which the Court addresses a claim by a Texas death row inmate that he is insane; and therefore not subject to execution. The opinion is lengthy and worthy of study, but the Court concluded: 1) the Fifth Circuit applied a too restrictive legal test for insanity (although the Court did not impose a definitive test); and 2) the AEDPA bar on "second or successive" applications does not apply to Ford (insanity) claims brought in an application filed when the claim is first ripe.
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In re: Dewitt McDonald, Jr.,
No. 06-4120 (6th Cir., January 10, 2008): Habeas Corpus; Second/Successive: McDonald is granted permission from the Circuit to file a second habeas petition on a newly discovered facts(!) This is a rarity in habeas corpus praxis but the facts alleged by McDonald fit the bill. McDonald was convicted of multiple counts, including murder, primarily on the strength of the State's star witness, Krista Harris. However, Harris has since alleged by affidavit that the prosecutor in the case threatened her with false criminal charges to not only deliver perjured testimony against McDonald, but also to engage in non-consensual sex with the prosecutor; and, the allegations were corroborated by an affidavit from the prosecutor's brother.
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Yellowbear v. Wyoming Attorney General
No. 06-8064 (10th Cir., March 21, 2008) (Published): Habeas Corpus; Second/Successive: This is a convoluted habeas corpus case. Yellowbear was charged in Wyoming state court with a murder that he alleged occurred in Indian Country. He thus contested the state court's jurisdiction by bringing a habeas action in federal court under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254. However, he should have brought it under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241 and he did not exhaust state remedies. The District Court dismissed and he appealed. The Circuit construed it as a 2241 petition but did not grant a COA because of the failure to exhaust. While awaiting trial, he pursued the issue in the Wyoming state courts and exhausted his state court remedies. He then filed a proper 2241 action back in the federal District Court which was dismissed under the abstention doctrine (basically to go through the appeals process). Yellowbear was found guilty and sentenced to life. NOW, poor Yellowbear, who filed a 2241 motion, must actually proceed under 2254(!) HELD: Reversed and remanded for the District Court to permit Yellowbear the opportunity to recharacterize his petition as one under 2254. NOTE: The panel described the difference between the two statutes as: 2241: A vehicle for challenging pre-trial detention or for attacking the execution of a sentence. 2254: A vehicle for attacking the validity of a conviction and sentence.
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