|
|
|
| Death Penalty |
|
People v. Harlan,
No. 03SA173 (Colo., March 28, 2005): Colorado capital murder case where penalty vacated because juror brought a Bible into the deliberation room, prior to the sentencing decision, and read passages concerning the death penalty. The same thing happened in Jay Wesley Neill's case (the Geronimo bank robbery/murders here in Oklahoma) and Jeremy Lowrey and I made the same argument to COCA (and later I made the argument in the federal courts) but no relief for Jay.
|
|
|
Deck v. Missouri,
No. 04-5293 (May 23, 2005): Straightforward opinion holding that, in a capital murder case, the State may not visibly shackle the Defendant during the penalty phase absent specific and compelling reasons related to the Defendant's case (i.e., security). Justice Thomas, joined by Scalia, delivered an inspired dissent that could serve as a treatise on the history of shackling defendants in criminal trials.
|
|
|
Laird v. Horn,
No. 01-9012 (3rd Cir., July 19, 2005): State capital death sentences and convictions reversed in habeas based upon accomplice liability instructions given during the first stage. Note: no AEDPA deference here because the state courts did not address the issue in the first instance.
|
|
|
In Re Hearn,
No. 04-10245 (5th Cir., July 6, 2005): The Fifth Circuit enters a stay of execution and allows death row inmate a lawyer to prepare an application to seek a successive habeas petition based upon an Atkins claim.
|
|
Williams v. State,
2008 OK CR 19 (June 25, 2008): Death Penalty; State Cases: Capital murder case out of Tulsa County AFFIRMED over over claims involving: 1) jury selection; 2) 2404(B) evidence of a prior robbery to prove identity; 3) pat-down search was reasonable; 4) the prosecutor exceeded the scope of cross-examination of a witness; 5) various evidentiary issues (the introduction of a silhouette target, photographs of the apartment, etc.); 6) a police officer testifying about injuries to Williams at the time of the arrest; 7) insufficient evidence of First Degree Murder; 8) improper victim impact testimony; instructional error in defining mitigation evidence; 9) constitutionality of continuing threat; and 10) prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments as well as other alleged misconduct; and 11) miscellaneous allegations of IAC, principally of counsel's failure to lodge objections to many of these claims.
|
|
Kennedy v. Louisiana,
No. 07-343 (U.S., June 25, 2008): Death Penalty; Supreme Court Cases: The Eighth Amendment bars Louisiana from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the victim's death.
|
|
|
White v. Mitchell,
No. 02-3073 (6th Cir., December 7, 2005): Excellent penalty-phase winner in a capital habeas case based on a biased juror. This case is highly unusual in that the juror gave conflicting statements regarding her ability to be fair and impartial, but the Circuit reversed anyway. This is a case where White was convicted and sentenced to death in Ohio for killing a State Trooper(!). In the typical case, the appellate courts have given great deference to the decision of the trial court who is in the position to see and hear the juror. Frankly, this case seems like a cert. candidate because I think under strict AEDPA deferential standards the circuit's decision is not correct, but if it stands it's good break for White.
|
|
|
Walton v. Johnson,
No. 04-19 (4th Cir., March 9, 2006) (en banc): Walton committed a triple-murder in Virginia, plead guilty, and was sentenced to death. The evidence supported a finding that Walton apparently believes that he will come back after his death in the execution chamber "to be with his honeys" and "get a Burger King." In this fractured, en banc opinion, the Fourth Circuit split 7-6 on the issues of the standards for insanity under Ford and mental retardation under Atkins. The Circuit held that the proper standard for insanity (such that would prevent execution under the Constitution) is Justice Powell's two-part test under Ford: 1) whether the condemned understands that he is to be punished by execution and 2) whether he understands why he is to be punished. Walton also could muster only a 77 on his IQ test and thus was not mentally retarded. The majority affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the insanity claim and chose to strictly limit the legal test to avoid any philosophical element. DISSENT: The six dissenters would require a specific finding that the condemned understand that execution involves the end of his physical life. BONUS: Judge Williams, concurring, noted that death is a philosophical perspective depending on a person's Weltanschauung(!) Weltanschauung of course means: a collection of beliefs about life and the universe held by an individual or a group. This case appears to be an excellent candidate for certiorari review by the Supreme Court.
|
|
|
Dickerson v. Bagley,
No. 04-4277 (6th Cir., July 7, 2006): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; Death Penalty: Capital case winner on grounds that counsel failed to investigate for the penalty phase.
|
|
|
Getsy v. Mitchell,
No. 03-3200 (6th Cir., August 2, 2006): Death Penalty: Enterprising decision in a 2-1 opinion vacating the death penalty under unusual facts and on the basis that the death penalty was imposed in an arbitrary manner in violation of Furman. The case was a murder-for-hire initiated by a man named Santine. Santine hired Getsy and two others to commit the murders and Getsy was the trigger-man. The other two plead out in exchange for dismissal of the Bill and Santine and Getsy went to trial. Santine was 35-years-old and clearly the more culpable of the two; yet, the jury acquitted him of the "murder for hire" part which made him ineligible for the death penalty so he was sentenced to life. Getsy was 19-years-old and his jury found the "murder for hire" part and sentenced him to death. The majority found that the inconsistent jury verdicts and the comparative culpability of the principals made the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to Getsy.
|
|
|
Offord v. State,
No. SC05-1611 (Fla., May 24, 2007): Death Penalty: Capital case involving a guilty plea to murder by Offord, who killed his wife with a claw hammer. Offord had a long history of serious mental illness. In this opinion, the Florida Supreme Court vacated the death penalty because it is disproportionate in this case where the only aggravator was "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" and measured against significant mitigation evidence (primarily in the form of mental health issues).
|
|
|
Uttecht v. Brown,
No. 06-413 (U.S., June 4, 2007): Death Penalty: In this 5-4 decision, the Ninth Circuit is reversed yet again, this time in a capital case involving the state trial court's exclusion of a juror after finding that the juror's views of the death penalty would significantly impair his duty as a juror. The juror gave ambiguous answers regarding his views on capital punishment and the Supreme Court held that the opinion of the state appellate court did not apply unreasonably Supreme Court precedent in finding the excusal of the juror proper. It should also be noted that this case is not very strong because defense counsel did not object to the excusal at trial. This case is really about federal court deference to state court decisions under the AEDPA rather than a foray into new legal rules governing capital case juror qualifications.
|
|
State v. Mata
No. S-05-1268 (Neb., February 8, 2008): Death Penalty: The Nebraska Supreme Court declares that the use of the electric chair as a method of execution is "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Nebraska Constitution
|
|
Lay v. State
2008 OK CR 7 (February 12, 2008): Death Penalty; State Cases: First Degree Murder and death sentence out of Tulsa County AFFIRMED over largely undisputed facts and claims attacking the sentence. Lay and his son attempted a bank robbery in Tulsa and ended up in a gun battle in which a security guard was killed. Lay represented himself and asserted on appeal that he had no right to pro se representation during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. The Court disagreed, but issued a rule in this case that requires the trial court to appoint stand-by counsel for pro se defendants in capital trials. The Court also refused to grant relief on claims of juror misconduct in failing to divulge knowledge of Lay's wife and in failing to allow Lay to present a "necessity defense" even though it appears that the trial court allowed most of it. Lay asserted that he and his son needed to rob the bank in order to obtain money to buy guns so they could stop government atrocities. It appears Lay was trying to overthrow the current federal government. For some reason, the Court did seem too receptive to this claim. Probably the true import of this case is that the Court held that OUJI-CR 4-77 is still required even though Easlick v. State appeared to invalidate it (it involves the explanation of how aggravating circumstances are to be found and that if the State relies on circumstantial evidence it must be inconsistent with any reasonable theory or conclusion other than the existence of the aggravator
|
|
Alderman v. Donald
No. 1:07-CV-1474-BBM (N.D. Ga, Atlanta Div., May 2, 2008): Death Penalty: This is a District Court order disposing of a death row inmate's civil rights case on the lethal injection issue. This is one of (if not the) first post-Baze cases. Bottom line: the Georgia protocol poses no more risk of substantial harm than the Kentucky protocol affirmed in Baze. I suspect that other courts will follow suit
|
|
|
|
