Several very good wins to report this week, including a surprising win in a child sex case that resulted in a reversal because the State was allowed to use evidence of "other crimes" to pile on the accused.  Usually, trial judges let this kind of evidence in with some regularity but in sex cases there are even more relaxed standards.  Also, I plan to name the trial judge at the end of each case, particularly the reversals, so we can get a sense of who is being reversed out there.  Judge Richard G. Van Dyck (Grady County) deserves to be singled out this week for atrocious judicial conduct in two cases, including letting the prosecution vilify the accused more than usual in a Murder case for which he was soundly criticized by the Court of Criminal Appeals for letting the State go too far.---Ed.  


Howell v. State, 2006 OK CR 28 (June 29, 2006):  Death Penalty; Mental Retardation:  Denial of post-conviction relief in a death penalty case raising a claim of mental retardation over a several claims of error.    

Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 27 (June 29, 2006):  Short order granting re-hearing in a death penalty case but denying relief.  The Court apparently overlooked two issues that were presented in the appeal (lesser instructions and prosecutorial misconduct) and found the issues did not warrant reversal.
 
Dunkle v. State, 2006 OK CR 29 (July 7, 2006):  Character Evidence; Crime Scene Reconstruction:  Laura Dunkle was convicted of Murder in the First Degree in Grady County and sentenced to LWOP in the shooting death of her fiancee.  Reversed and remanded for new trial on two grounds:  1) improper introduction of character evidence, primarily that Dunkle practiced witchcraft and was a bad mother because DHS investigated her care of her children; and 2) improper introduction of a computer-generated crime scene re-enactment.  The "witchcraft" evidence is particularly appalling because the State's only proffered reason for introducing it was to show that "this is the person she is" and that she was "unusual."  The State did not tie the "witchcraft" to any aspect of the case other than to vilify the accused and the trial judge allowed the State to bring in just about anything toward that end, almost all of it irrelevant to the charge.  Trial Judge:  Richard G. Van Dyck, Grady County.

Maurice Ladon Miller v. State, No. F-2005-603 (Okl.Cr., July 5, 2006) (unpublished):  Right to Present a Defense:  Miller was convicted in Oklahoma County of Murder in the First Degree and sentenced to straight life.  His trial lawyer interviewed a co-defendant and taped it.  During the interview, the co-defendant made statements that exculpated Miller which, of course, made them inadmissible in the view of the trial judge.  Reversed and remanded for new trial in the basis that Miller was denied the right to present a defense.  NOTE:  in his concurring in part/dissenting in part opinion, Judge Lumpkin chastised the majority for enlarging the hearsay exception allowing such evidence because "[t]o do so opens the door to manufactured hearsay and the denial of the State's right to confront witnesses."  I suppose he did not say the constitutional right of the State to confront witnesses but still an odd comment to make.  Trial Judge:  Daniel Owens, Oklahoma County.

Justin Lynn Hammons v. State, No. F-2004-1277 (Okl.Cr., June 29, 2006) (unpublished):  Jurors:  Hammons was mauled in Tulsa County on five counts of various drug charges, including a trafficking for which he received 75 years.  Count 3 was a conviction for Maintaining a Dwelling where CDS are kept and he received 8 years for that.  During deliberations, the jury became deadlocked on Count 3.  However, instead of calling the entire jury into court, the trial judge apparently called only the foreman into court and instructed him concerning the unanimity requirement and directed him to so instruct the other jurors.  Held:  this was error with presumed prejudice and Count 3 is reversed.  Trial Judge:  P. Thomas Thornbrugh, Tulsa County.

Emily Burns v. State, No. C-2005-311 (Okl.Cr., June 29, 2006) (unpublished):  Guilty Pleas:  Here is good example of justice in Grady County.  Emily Burns was a 21-year-old mother with no priors who had a drug problem.  She was high when she entered a convenience store, pulled her shirt up over her mouth and nose and exposed a gun in her waistband to the clerk.  The "gun" was an imitation BB gun that she never removed or brandished.  She was a regular at the store, the clerk could see clearly that she was stoned, and because of her "poor disguise, the fact that the clerk knew Burns as a regular customer and the security at the convenience store, the clerk initially thought the robbery was a joke."  For this, Burns was sentenced after plea of guilty to 25 years for Armed Robbery which she must serve at 85%.  HELD:  conviction affirmed but sentence modified to 10 years because the trial judge did not consider the full range of punishment.  The trial judge made this statement during sentencing:  "And in this period of time [25 years] that I've been involved in law enforcement as a prosecutor and as a judge I've never recommended or sentenced anyone to less than 25 years incarceration for an armed robbery."  Trial Judge:  Richard G. Van Dyck, Grady County.

George Luther Carter, III, v. State, No. F-2005-288 (Okl.Cr., June 30, 2006) (unpublished):  "Bad Acts":  Carter was convicted of Child Sexual Abuse and sentenced to 30 years.  Reversed and remanded for new trial based on the introduction of "other crimes" evidence.  The State's Burks notice sought to introduce the testimony of "S.P.," age 10, who testified over defense objection that Carter had inserted his finger into her vagina (Rape I by Instrumentation).  In reversing, the Court discussed the "greater latitude rule" in Myers v. State, 2000 OK CR 25, which provides for more liberal admission of other crimes in sex crime cases in which the victim is a child.  The Court noted however that other crimes evidence is still governed by evidentiary statutes that require the State to show a "visible connection" between the other crime and the charged crime, the probative value must outweigh the prejudicial effect, and the evidence must prove one of the proper purposes under 2404(B).  In this case, the Court held that there was no connection between the sexual assault on "S.P." and the one upon the complaining witness who was the subject of the new charge, other than the identity of the perpetrator.  The Court stated specifically that a common scheme or plan is not established by the mere allegation that the accused committed another sexual offense against a child in the past.  NOTE:  as far as I know, this is the only case from the Court of Criminal Appeals that finds reversible error even when the greater latitude rule applies.  This case should be published.  Trial Judge:  Paul M. Vassar, Lincoln County.


Tenth Circuit

United States v. Moran, No. 05-3211 (10th Cir., June 28, 2006) (Published):  Guilty Pleas; Federal:  Poor Moran was faced with a felony charge of User of a Controlled Substance in Possession of Ammunition.  He worked out a good deal with the Government and plead to a misdemeanor count of possession of marijuana.  The felony count as dismissed.  However, the intrepid Moran told his drug counselor the day after the plea that he did not in fact possess marijuana on the day in question and that he was forced to say that by the Government and his attorney.  This information made its way back to the trial judge who promptly held a hearing and withdrew his prior acceptance of the plea to the misdemeanor because it was not supported by a factual basis.  Moran ended up pleading guilty to the felony count as charged in the original indictment.  AFFIRMED.

United States v. Tucker, No. 05-3259 (10th Cir., June 28, 2006) (Published):  Pro Se Representation:  Tucker had many conflicts with his trial counsel and proceeded to jury trial on charges of Possession of a Firearm and Possession of Ammunition.  He was convicted of Possession of Ammunition but acquitted on the Firearm charge.  HELD:  the trial court erred in not allowing Tucker to represent himself during voir dire.  Reversed and remanded for new trial.  Good discussion of pro se representation, and note that this error is "structural" and not amenable to harmless error analysis.

United States v. Stephenson, No. 05-3165 (10th Cir., June 29, 2006) (Published):  1. Searches and Seizures; Traffic Stops; 2. Federal Sentencing Guidelines; "Safety Valve":  A Kansas trooper stopped a truck based only upon what he observed to be modifications of the truck bed that would likely house a hidden compartment that may contain contraband.  That was the sole basis for the stop.  The trooper did not observe any traffic violation.  Based upon this observation, he stopped the truck and called a drug dog which alerted.  HELD:  AFFIRMED.  The panel held that the trooper's observations constituted sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop the truck.  Ugh.  There is something terribly wrong in the courts when they allow this sort of thing.  Concerning the "safety valve" provision, the panel clarified that it is the responsibility of the accused to proffer everything he knows to the government, rather than the responsibility of the government to accord the accused the opportunity to divulge what he knows.

United States v. Ortuno-Caballero, No. 05-2206 (10th Cir., June 29, 2006) (Unpublished):  Federal Sentencing Guidelines; "Crime of Violence":  This case explores the conundrum in federal sentencing of what constitutes a "crime of violence."  This phrase is a legal term of art that has different definitions within the federal sentencing scheme.  In this case, the accused was convicted of illegal re-entry and the District Court held that a Colorado conviction of "First Degree Criminal Trespass of a Dwelling" constituted a "crime of violence" and thus warranted a 16-level enhancement.  The panel found plain error and remanded for re-sentencing.  Judge O'Brien's concurring opinion is a good primer on the disparate treatment of what constitutes a "crime of violence" in the federal system.  He quips:  "The lesson seems to be that logic plays no role; rote application of the various guideline definitions is the order of the day.  It's a funny way to run a railroad." 

United States v. Gillespie, No. 05-6292 (10th Cir., June 30, 2006) (Published):  1.  Commerce Clause; 2. Excessive Sentence:  This is the case involving the Molotov cocktail attack on the synagogue in Oklahoma City.  No one was injured and Gillespie videotaped himself doing the deed.  He went to jury trial and was convicted.  He was sentenced on three counts which shook out to an aggregate sentence of 468 months (39 years).  Gillespie appealed on several grounds but all were denied.  This case contains an interesting analysis of the Commerce Clause concerning whether churches "affect" interstate commerce.  The synagogue in this case did so because it also had a pre-school and a gift shop in addition to being a house of worship.  The panel also produced a letter from Gillespie to the synagogue officials which was filled with racial hate.  The panel recognized a "narrow" proportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment that governs non-capital cases but as other cases have held, this principle is "narrow" indeed and the 39-years sentence was upheld.

United States v. Taylor, No. 05-3417 (10th Cir., July 5, 2006) (Published):  Habeas Corpus; COA:  This case involved a federal prisoner's application for a Certificate of Appealability to present several claims to the Court of Appeals.  In habeas cases, if the Petitioner is denied in the District Court, he can not appeal as a matter of right; rather, he must apply for the COA and show that his issues are debatable among reasonable jurists.  The panel in this case concluded that none of Taylor's issues were debatable and it denied the COA and dismissed the appeal.  I am not sure why this case was published.

United States v. Ingle, No. 06-5091 (10th Cir., July 5, 2006) (Unpublished):  Bail; Federal:  Ingle entered a guilty plea to a charge of Felon in Possession of a Firearm.  The District Court held that this was a "crime of violence" and thus Ingle must be detained pending sentencing.  HELD:  a violation of 922(g)(1) is not a crime of violence under the statutory definition and the District Court is REVERSED(!)  The panel noted a circuit split on this issue but sided with the majority.

United States v. Qayyum, No. 04-1509 (10th Cir., July 6, 2006) (Published):  Conspiracy:  The District Court dismissed a conspiracy count (alleging conspiracy to defraud by intending to keep an illegal alien in the United States) based upon the statute of limitations (five years).  The Government appealed and the panel reversed.  Good discussion of how statutes of limitations apply to conspiracy cases.

United States v. DeShazer, No. 05-8053 (10th Cir., July 7, 2006) (Published):  Speedy Trial:  Complex factual case involving an accused with mental problems whose federal prosecution had been pending for six years.  In this appeal, the panel treats the issue as a motion to dismiss based on speedy trial and holds that such issues are not properly before the court on an interlocutory basis.  Appeal dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.


United States Supreme Court

Clark v. Arizona, No. 05-5966 (U.S., June 29, 2006):  Insanity/Competency:  The venerable test for insanity is encapsulated in M'Naghten's Case.  For some reason, the state of Arizona has changed this standard by statute.  The Supreme Court held that Due Process does not impede Arizona from doing this, holding:  "Due Process does not prohibit Arizona's use of an insanity test stated solely in terms of the capacity to tell whether an act charged as a crime was right or wrong.

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, No. 04-10566 (U.S., June 28, 2006):  Vienna Convention.  This case deals with the provisions of the Vienna Convention which mandate that a foreign national arrested in the United States must be informed of his/her right to contact and seek help from his/her consulate.  In this case, the Court, in a fractured and lengthy opinion, held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the Vienna Convention (to bar the admission of custodial statements in this case) and that the normal procedural default rules of the State are enforceable against the provisions of the Vienna Convention (such as when a petitioner does not raise it on direct appeal and the State courts deem the claim as having been waived).

Washington v. Recuenco, No. 05-83 (U.S., June 26, 2006):  Standards of Review:  Recuenco threatened his wife with a handgun and was convicted by a jury of second degree assault by a "deadly weapon."  The jury did not find specifically that he assaulted her with a handgun.  The trial judge enhanced the sentence by finding that the assault was committed with a handgun in violation of Apprendi/Blakely.  The Washtington state courts held that such an error was "structural error" and must result in automatic reversal.  HELD:  Apprendi/Blakely error is not structural error and is subject to harmless error analysis.

Kansas v. Marsh, No. 04-1170 (U.S., June 26, 2006):  Death Penalty:  Kansas death penalty statutes mandate that when aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances the death penalty must be imposed; or put another way, if the jury finds that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise, it must impose death.  The Court held that this statute was constitutional.  Particularly interesting is Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in which he addresses directly many of the anti-death penalty arguments in his inimitable style.

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, No. 05-352 (U.S., June 26, 2006):  Counsel of Choice:  Deprivation of the right to counsel of choice is structural error that mandates automatic reversal.


Other Cases of Note

United States v. Jones, No. 05-3001 (3rd Cir., June 28, 2006):  Waiver:  Reversal on the basis that Jones's waiver of his right to counsel was not adequate on the record.  Jones indicated that he wanted to proceed pro se but would agree to standby counsel.  The District Court seemed to say to Jones that standby counsel would not be something to which he was entitled and the discussion became ambiguous from there.  Good discussion of the right to proceed pro se and the standards governing waiver of the right to counsel.

Adams v. Bertrand, No. 05-1573 (7th Cir., June 30, 2006):  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:  Three men were accused of what essentially is a date-rape at a college campus.  Adams went to trial and was convicted.  He did not call any witnesses.  However, one of the co-defendants called a witness at trial who testified that she saw the complaining witness smoking cigarettes with the three men in the hallway after the alleged sexual assault.  That trial ended in a hung jury.  The Circuit found this persuasive evidence of IAC for failing to investigate the case and call the defense witness.

People v. Van Deusen, No. 100 (N.Y. App., June 29, 2006):  Guilty Pleas:  Guilty plea allowed to be withdrawn because accused was not advised of mandatory post-release supervision, thus the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.

Dickerson v. Bagley, No. 04-4277 (6th Cir., July 7, 2006):  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; Death Penalty:  Capital case winner on grounds that counsel failed to investigate for the penalty phase. 

Flowers v. State, No. 2004-DP-00738 (Miss., June 29, 2006):  Peremptory Challenges/Batson.  Capital case winner out of Mississippi on a Batson claim.  I suppose when the prosecutor uses every single peremptory challenge to strike a black juror, including the three allowed for the alternate, even the Supreme Court of Mississippi must take notice.


Judicial Races--Opinion by James L. Hankins

When I began this newsletter, about a year and a half ago now, I never envisioned doing much more than reporting the cases.  However, there are several judicial races going on now and politics is in the air.  I cannot help myself.  There are two judicial races in Oklahoma County that have caught my attention.

Judge Susan Caswell/Bill Graves:  Graves is a staunch conservative and, under other circumstances, it would be difficult to endorse him as a judicial candidate with an eye toward making sure the rights of those accused of crimes are protected.  However, he is running against Judge Susan Caswell, who, as far as I know, is the only sitting state District Judge who has been described by a sitting Judge of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals as unfit to sit as a judge in any criminal case.  She was soundly rebuked by the Court of Criminal Appeals just last month in the Mitchell case for being so biased in favor of the prosecution that the Court surmised that she had "forgotten, at least momentarily, where she was sitting and what she was wearing."  She is a remnant of the prosecutorial staff created by Bob Macy and apparently learned what she knows about the criminal justice system and the Constitution trying cases with him.

If you have ever wondered what it would be like trying your case if the prosecutor was the judge, you need only try a case in her court.  Graves is the clear choice in this race for the hope of a semblance of fairness and impartiality in the Oklahoma County courthouse.  Evidence of this fact is found in a recent edition of The Oklahoma Observer (June 25, 2006, page 3).  As many of you may know, Frosty Troy is the walking definition of a Yellow Dog Democrat, or in the words of my old boss, Stephen Jones, he is "an unreconstructed FDR Democrat."

Here is what Frosty Troy had to say about the Graves/Caswell race:  "By all means vote for former GOP Rep. Bill Graves for Oklahoma County district judge---supremely preferable to the incompetent, biased Susan Caswell."  That is, of course, a very strong statement; and it is even stronger considering the political backgrounds of Troy and Graves.  Yet, in a race between Caswell and Graves, Troy perceives Graves as the superior candidate.  I think this says a lot about Graves who, at the very least, is likely to apply the law evenhandedly in the courtroom and not blatantly side with the prosecution at every turn.

Judge Vicki Robertson/Patrick Crawley:  Judge Robertson handles primarily a civil docket, so it is somewhat puzzling why Crawley wishes to fill that seat, unless of course he wishes to acquire more criminal cases once on the bench.  Crawley is a former police officer and career prosecutor, having served in the Office of the Attorney General before bouncing back to the Oklahoma County District Attorney's Office where he handles quite a few of the appellate matters.

I have dealt with Crawley on cases and have read many of his written arguments in motions and briefs he has filed.  My opinion is that if he is elected to the bench Oklahoma County defense attorneys will have two "Susan Caswells" with which to deal. 

Judge Vicki Robertson, on the other hand, has a solid reputation for fairness, cool deliberation, and evenhanded application of the law to the facts at hand.  She is unquestionably one of the cream of the crop in Oklahoma County and it would be a very sad day for the rule of law if she were defeated.


Juror Comments on a Texas DUI Case

A person who posts frequently on a Usenet Newsgroup I read described recently his experience as a juror in a DUI case in Texas (Harris County).  I did not solicit his comments and he has granted permission for me to post his comments here.  I think you will find it interesting:

I had the good fortune to spend my last two days on jury duty. I would have been done in less than 4 hours if the jury pool wasn't rigged. This was a misdemeanor case, which means a pool of 20 to select 6 jurors for the case. I was juror number 5. Bad news. Prior to starting the jury selection process, the defense attorney asked for a shuffle. I had no idea what that meant, but I was guessing it had to do with our numbers and I might be saved.

They then started the questioning after the judge said he hoped to have the case completed the same day. It became clear very quickly that this was a DWI case. The prosecutor was making a big point out of what intoxicated meant. Everyone kept saying 08 blood alcohol content (our state's legal limit) and finally she got frustrated and gave us the legal definition. Diminished mental and/or physical faculties defines intoxication in Harris County at least. So we go through all the questions from the prosecutor and defense attorney and they're ready to start the process. Then we find out that "shuffle" definitely means reassigning the juror numbers. I finally get a break goes through my mind. The new numbers come out and I still have a bad number - 8. Of course I end up on the panel of 6. The highest number on the jury was 12, so anything higher and I would have dodged it.

The prosecutor made her opening statement and the defense passed. Then the prosecutor called the first witness, who was the original officer that pulled the guy over. The officer stated that the guy was going 50 mph in a 30 mph zone, which he determined by "pacing" the car. He explained that meant he caught up to him and followed him long enough to determine his speed. After doing so, he pulled the guy over. It was 3:15 on a Saturday morning, and when he asked for his license and registration, he smelled alcohol on the driver's breath. He called for backup and asked the driver to get out of his car. The driver complied. The officer wanted to do a field sobriety test and the driver refused to do it.

At this point, the officer hauled him into the location where they bring their intoxicated suspects. This was pretty much the end of his testimony. The defense attorney asked a few mundane questions including whether or not he was getting paid overtime for his testimony. We were excused for lunch and the bailiff took us to an outstanding Cajun cafe with a $7.00 tab on the county. I was able to get a large bowl of red beans and rice with an extra sausage link and an iced tea with no money out my pocket.

The next witness was the officer in charge of administering the breathalyzer instrument at the intoxicated center. He testified that the witness refused to take the test and he appeared to be intoxicated. He mentioned a strong smell of alcohol, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes. The final witness was another officer on the DWI task force that came in to administer a field sobriety test. After a bunch of interesting testimony about how the tests work, he told us that the defendant refused to take the test again.

This time, however, they had it on videotape. They showed us the tape and the guy's speech was not slurred. The prosecutor rested her case and the defense immediately rested his case. We listened to the two closing arguments and it was off to deliberations. This was about 4:30 yesterday afternoon. We deliberated an hour or so and the judge sent us home. There were two people on the jury that were firmly convinced this guy was guilty just because three police officers thought he was intoxicated.

Me and another guy said the prosecution did not meet the burden of proof. If the original officer followed him long enough to determine his speed and didn't witness anything other than speeding, I don't believe he had lost any mental or physical faculties. He never indicated that the guy drifted in his lane, ran a red light, or any of the other things you would expect an intoxicated driver to do. All that led to the original pullover was the speeding. The guy looked fine on the tape. There was no way in hell I was going to call him guilty. Finally at 11:00 this morning, we sent a note to the judge saying we were hopelessly deadlocked. The judge gave us a pep talk and sent us back to keep trying. About 30 minutes later he called us back out to the courtroom and asked if we were getting any closer. We told him no and it was over. The interesting thing here is that if you refuse to do the breath test here you automatically lose your license for 180 days. If you take it and fail, you lose your license for 90 days.

Other comments the juror made:

I was surprised he was tried. The only thing that got it to court IMHO was a comment he made to the breathalyzer guy saying "my lawyer told me don't do shit and he'll get me off." I think that got the DA interested enough to chase his less senior assistant after it.

NOTE:  I suspect inquisitive jurors like this are few and far between.  I did find his comments regarding the videotape interesting. 


Victories

"Send lawyers, guns and money, the shit has hit the fan."
--Warren Zevon, "Lawyers, Guns and Money" (song) (1978)




KIMBERLY ADAMS, McAlester, scored a terrific appellate win in the Carter case above and vanquished the formidable "greater latitude rule" in sex cases.  Fabulous appellate victory, Kimberly, and move to get this case PUBLISHED!

IRVEN R. BOX, OKC, knocked off 15 years at 85% for the hapless Ms. Burns in a guilty plea case reported above.  This is a very unusual result (straight modification of sentence without being allowed to actually withdraw the plea).  Good job, Irven!

CAROLYN L. MERRITT, OKC Pub. Def., won a reversal for Mr. Miller in a murder case in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.  Very nice, Carolyn!

STEVE NASH, OKC, heard three "not guilty" verdicts in Judge Bass's courtroom a couple weeks ago.  I do not have much detail other than his client was charged with two counts of lewd acts and one count of forcible sodomy.  Great job, Steve! 

JAMIE D. PYBAS, OIDS, secured the appellate win in the Dunkle case above, a smooth reversal on a Murder I conviction.  Jamie truly is one of the best appellate minds in the State.  Congrats, Jamie!

TRACEY SCHUMACHER, Norman, apparently went to war with prosecutor Victoria Gillispie in hard-fought jury trial in which Tracey's client was accused of rape by instrumentation of his three-year-old daughter.  After a week long trial, the Cleveland County jury found the client not guilty last Monday.  Client and his putative/estranged wife were locked into a bitter divorce and custody dispute and the allegations arose under these circumstances.  According to the newspaper article, Tracey's defense theory was that the mother of the child used the child "as a pawn in the divorce."  Terrific victory, Tracey!


Hearsay

CELL PHONES BIGGER HAZARD THAN DRUNKS:  Interesting article about a study where the driving of cell phone users was compared to intoxicated drivers and drivers who were neither intoxicated nor using cell phones.

FORMER JUDGE CONVICTED:  You had to have heard by now that a jury in Creek County convicted former judge Donald Thompson of four counts of masturbating with a penis pump during criminal trials.  I'm just happy this sordid incident is over and our state can avoid any more humiliation.  Even the newspapers in Australia reported this story; as did ones in Canada.  HERE is an article that details some of the chances Thompson had to retire quietly and avoid any criminal proceedings, and then he could have plead to some misdemeanor counts.  But for some reason he chose to hold a press conference and attack the women accusing him rather than avoid a criminal trial and keep his retirement.  Inexplicable.

TEXAS PROSECUTOR ARRESTED IN OKLAHOMA:  A prosecutor in Texas (Montague, Archer, and Clay Counties) was arrested at Lake Texhoma over the Independence Day holiday on suspicion of DUI.  He was arrested after he failed a filed sobriety test and blew a .22 on the breath test.  He also had loaded handguns in his truck.

SEX OFFENDER LAW ENACTED:  Gov. Henry put more restrictions on sex offenders by barring them from living within 2,000 feet of any public or private school, playground, park or licensed child-care center.  Oddly enough, a law enforcement official had concerns over the new law because if the restrictions become too burdensome the offenders simply will not register, even though they will continue to live in the area.  The article also noted that only eight percent of Tulsa is available for sex offenders to live legally.   



UPCOMING EVENTS/CLE COURSES (IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER):

JULY 27, 2006:  OCDLA DEATH PENALTY SEMINAR:  This will take place Thursday, July 27--Friday, July 28, 2006, at Oklahoma City University.  The times and registration info will be available soon.  Speakers include:  Rob Ravitz, Rob Nigh, Brian Hermansen, Dick Burr, Vicki Werneke, Cynthia Hartung, Sid Conway, Lee Ann Peters, Wendi Hobbs, Randy Bauman, Creekmore Wallace, Jack Gordon, Mark Henricksen, Lanita Henricksen, Brenda McCray, Sandra Collett, Kim Marks, Jim Fowler, Scott Braden, and Lisa McCalmont.

SEPTEMBER 14, 2006:  The Federal Bar Association presents this program at the Petroleum Club in Oklahoma City featuring Morris Dees, the founder of the Southern Poverty Law Center.  Mr. Dees will give a presentation on the topic, "With Justice for All."  FBA members $20, all others $30.  To sign up, contact Rosene Coleman at 405.609.5320 or at rosene_coleman@okwd.uscourts.gov.  




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